Reparations

The reparations debate in the context of the transatlantic slave trade is a subject that refuses to disappear. In contemporary discourse, it is persistently framed as one of the defining moral questions of our time: should there be reparations?

In recent years, the debate has become increasingly polemical. If I am honest, it has never been a subject of deep personal fascination. I hold my own nuanced views, some of which I have written about publicly, but I have largely resisted engaging at length. This reluctance is not born of indifference, but of dissatisfaction.

The reparations debate today operates almost entirely within an ideological register rather than a theological or ethical one. As a result, it often produces morally thin conclusions, heavy on assertion and light on formation. Questions of virtue, responsibility, justice, and moral posture are rarely taken seriously. Reparations are discussed as policy demands or symbolic gestures, rather than as ethical acts rooted in character and intention.

From a Christian perspective, much of the instinct behind reparations makes sense. Scripture affirms restitution. Justice, biblically understood, must cost something; it involves repair, not merely apology. Sin is not only personal but social in its consequences.

We see this pattern repeatedly. Slavery, colonial extraction, and the construction of racial hierarchies were not merely the result of individual moral failure. They shaped economies, laws, and cultural imaginaries, structures that persist long after the original perpetrators are gone. It is therefore coherent, within a biblical framework, to argue that communities may owe repair even when individual members are not personally culpable.

Biblical justice, however, has a particular character. It is material, because harm is real and concrete. It is costly, because repair demands sacrifice. And it is relational, because its aim is the restoration of fellowship, not the settling of abstract accounts.

For this reason, biblical restitution seeks to heal the fabric of communal life rather than to produce permanent moral debtors. Crucially, it must flow from repentance: a recognition and conviction that one has fallen short of God’s good order. Once repair is severed from conscience and transformed into compulsory moral accounting, it ceases to form virtue and begins instead to generate resentment.

In Western discourse, reparations are most often approached through an ideological lens. Yet reparations are not inherently ideological. Across cultures and moral traditions, wrongdoing has long been understood to require tangible repair. Purely verbal remorse is widely regarded as insufficient.

Indeed, many people, even across sharp ideological and political divides, share what might be described as a biblically instinctive sense that historic injustice demands some material response. This intuition is reflected, for example, in the secular logic of international law, where restitution and compensation function as recognisable categories of justice.

To reject reparation in principle, then, is to misunderstand why the question continues to resurface. The difficulty lies not in the idea of reparations itself, but in the manner in which contemporary proposals have been articulated and advanced.

As discussed earlier, biblical restitution assumes repentance, acknowledgment of wrongdoing, and a desire for restored relationship. Contemporary reparations discourse, by contrast, often functions less as moral repair and more as symbolic performance, serving as a form of collective moral signalling or ideological enforcement.

This helps explain why reparations are frequently framed as a partisan issue rather than a shared moral concern. Little attention is given to the moral agency or heart posture of those expected to provide repair. The emphasis is placed almost entirely on outcomes, not on the formation of conscience.

Here we see a deeper blind spot of post-Christian Western society, where justice becomes increasingly abstracted from virtue. Reparations are no longer primarily about healing fractured relationships, but about occupying the moral high ground. They become symbols in a broader struggle between the “just” and the “unjust,” with one’s position functioning as a form of allegiance to a moral tribe.

Within this framework, reparations risk becoming instruments of division rather than means of genuine repair.

There is also a moral danger in the monetisation of injustice. The impact of the transatlantic slave trade was not solely economic. How, then, do we translate generational trauma into financial figures? Do we not risk reducing descendants into mere claimants, and history into a balance sheet?

This is not as straightforward as an individual seeking compensation for racial discrimination in the workplace, where harm is direct, personal, and measurable. With slavery, colonialism, and empire, no one alive today has experienced the original injustice first-hand. This does not negate the reality that their consequences continue to be felt. It does, however, complicate the relational dynamic that biblical restitution assumes.

When suffering is priced, people cease to be neighbours and become categories.

It is also vital to recognise that biblical restitution is voluntary rather than extracted under threat. Much of the contemporary reparations discourse centres on forms of legal coercion, often through state-led, taxpayer-funded mechanisms.

Coercion eliminates moral agency. Restitution becomes a compelled transfer that simulates repentance without any transformation of the heart. The result is not reconciliation, but the entrenchment of resentment.

Justice enforced by law may redistribute resources, but it cannot cultivate virtue, and in the biblical vision, virtue is central to genuine moral repair. If reconciliation is not the end toward which reparations aim, then they have defeated their purpose as an instrument of justice.

The Church of England has recently made headlines in relation to reparations, pledging £100 million under its Project Spire to address its historical links to slavery. Few would deny that the motivation behind such an initiative is rooted in a desire to pursue justice in good faith.

Yet our cultural inability to assess complex moral issues outside an ideological register has meant that responses have largely fallen into familiar camps. For some, the programme is dismissed as a divisive vanity project, a perception reinforced by a poll conducted by Merlin Strategy which found that 81 per cent of respondents believed Church funds should benefit local congregations rather than be directed toward slavery-related pay-outs. For others, opposition to the initiative is framed as hostility to justice itself.

What this episode reveals is a growing loss of moral grammar within British Christianity, a diminished capacity to wrestle with contentious issues without reducing them to zero-sum moral combat. Rather than engaging seriously with virtue, repentance, reconciliation, and the limits of coercion, the debate is absorbed into the same partisan dynamics that shape much of public life.

I do not know whether reparations, in the context of the transatlantic slave trade, are something that should ultimately be pursued. But neither should the idea be dismissed outright. It is a deeply complicated subject.

What is clear is that it deserves to be approached with seriousness, compassion, and an understanding that relational restoration must remain central to any reparative work.

I am reminded of Exodus 25:2, where God commands the Israelites to bring an offering “from everyone whose heart prompts them to give.” Before the tabernacle is constructed, before a single material is gathered, God makes it clear that His dwelling among His people begins with willing hearts.

This, I would argue, must also be the posture of the Church when participating in restitution and repair, one rooted in the character of God: love, mercy, and holiness.